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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
CaseNo.20030284-CA

vs.
JEAN FRED VENORD,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e) and Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(4).

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether counsel for the Defendant rendered deficient performance which fell

below an objective standard of professional judgment and that the deficiency was
ultimately prejudicial by introducing Defendant's prior criminal history, including his
previous incarceration for a year at the Salt Lake County Jail?
An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the first time on appeal
presents a question of law. State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 542 (Utah Ct.App.1998).

1

CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The text of all relevant statutory provisions is set forth in the Addenda.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

Venord appeals from the judgment, sentence, and commitment of the Fourth
Judicial District Court after being convicted on Assault by a Prisoner, a third degree
felony.
B.

Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition

On July 11, 2002, Jean Fred Venord was arrested on a warrant. (R. 4) The warrant
was ordered on June 13, 2002, after a Probable Cause Affidavit in Support of, and
Motion for an Arrest Warrant was filed on the same day. (R. 1-2) An Information was
filed by the Utah County Attorney's Office on June 18, 2002, charging Venord with two
counts of Assault by a Prisoner, both third degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code
Annotated § 76-5-102.5 (R. 5) Venord appeared pro se on July 15, 2002 on a Return on
Bench Warrant hearing, where bail was set at $3,000.00 cash or bond. (R. 7) A Felony
First Appearance was scheduled for August 6, 2002, where Venord was appointed a
Public Defender and the Court instructed Venord that if he wanted to address bail, his
Counsel could file a Motion to Address Bail. (R. 16-18) The Public Defender, Deborah
Hill, indeed filed a Motion to Address Bail on August 7, 2002. (R. 20) On August 9,
2002, Public Defender Hill filed a Withdrawal of Counsel, due to a conflict that existed
within the Public Defender's office. (R. 22) Mr. Phil Danielson subsequently appeared
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with Venord as the Public Defender on August 13, 2002, where bail was reduced to
$2,000.00 cash or bond, and a Preliminary Hearing was set for August 27, 2002. (R. 2325)
On August 27, 2002, Venord waived his right to a Preliminary Hearing and an
Entry of Plea hearing was set for September 10, 2002. (R. 36-38) At the Entry of Plea
hearing, Venord requested a Jury Trial setting that was scheduled for September 25,
2002. (R. 39-41)
On September 25, 2002, a jury trial was held before the Honorable Gary D. Stott.
Venord was convicted by the jury of one count of Assault by a Prisoner and acquitted of
the other count of the same charge. (R. 99-102)
Between the time of Venord's conviction and his sentencing date, Venord filed
some pro se motions; Motion to Request and Subpoena the Video, Tape, and Transcript.
Court Trial, (R. 213-216), Application to Proceed Prepayment of Fees and Affidavit for
Incarcerated Pro Se Plaintiffs, (R. 219), Writ of Habeas Corpus, (R. 220-226), Official
Notice, Pursuant Title 63 Chapter 30, Section 10, Sub-Section 2, Clauses 3, 4, 5, 7, 12
and 14, (R. 227-232), Civil Claim, (R. 233-235), Writ of Habeas Corpus Proceeding, (R.
239-240), Affidavit on Refusal to Sign Exhaustion of Administrative Remedy by Utah
County Jail, (R. 252-255), and a Motion to Request Written Transcript of a Videotape of
the Jury Trial. (R. 279-281) On February 26, 2002, The Honorable Anthony W. Schofield
dismissed all Motions and Requests made by the Defendant pro se, due to the fact that
Defendant had Counsel to represent him. (R. 294-298)
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After Defense Counsel found inconsistencies on the Pre-sentence Report that was
prepared by Adult Probation and Parole, an evidentiary hearing was set for sentencing
purposes. (R. 205-207) Venord was sentenced on February 26, 2003. Based on Venord's
conviction of a third degree felony, he was sentenced to an indeterminate term in the
Utah State Prison, not to exceed five years. Venord was given credit for time served in
the Utah County Jail and he was placed on probation for 36 months with supervision to
be provided by Adult Probation and Parole. (R. 294-298)
Venord filed a notice of appeal on March 28, 2003 (R. 311-312). Subsequently
this matter was transferred to this Court pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code
Annotated § 78-2-2(4).

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
Testimony of Officer Peter Quittner
Officer Quittner testified that he was an employee of the Utah County Sheriffs
Office where he worked in the processing of inmates at the Utah County Jail. (R. 347 at
67) Mr. Quittner identified the Defendant in the courtroom as an inmate whom Quittner
booked into the jail on February 15, 2002. Quittner also stated under direct examination
by the State that the Defendant was located in the booking area, while being processed,
and that Michael Phillips and Brady Carnes were also in the same waiting area. (R. 347
at 67) Quittner went on to testify that he witnessed the Defendant punching both Phillips
and Carnes. (R. 347 at 74-75)
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Testimony of Officer Darren Durfey
Officer Durfey testified that he also was employed by the Utah County Sheriffs
Office on February 13, 2002. (R. 347 at 102) Durfey also identified the Defendant in
Court as the individual whom Durfey saw punch Carnes several times in the waiting area
of the booking facility in the Utah County Jail. (R. 347 at 104-107) Durfey also stated
that Carnes had contusions on his forehead and cheek area after being assaulted by the
Defendant. (R. 347 at 108)

Testimony of Sergeant David Steele
Sergeant Steele took the stand, identified the Defendant in the court room, and
testified to having seen the Defendant assault Carnes in the Utah County Jail, where
Steele was employed by the Utah County Sheriffs Office. (R. 347 at 112-113)

Testimony of Jean F. Venord
At trial, the Defendant waived his right not to testify and was put on the stand by
Defense Counsel. (R. 347 at 119-139) During direct examination of the Defendant by
Defendant's Counsel, the following exchange took place:
Q:

A:
Q:
A:
Q:

Okay. Now, on this particular instance that we are talking about in
February of this year, you were taken to the Utah County Jail. Do you recall
that?
Yes.
Prior to that time, had you ever been in jail before?
Yes.
For what?
5

A
Q
A
Q
A
Q
A
Q
A:
Q:
A:

I was in jail in 1998 for a possession charge.
Possession of— a controlled substance.
Okay. And how long did you serve in jail for that charge?
A year.
Okay. And that was all the whole time in Salt Lake County?
Yes, it was.
Okay. All right. When you were brought to jail this time, what - why were
you brought to jail?
It was a warrant for shoplifting.
A shoplifting charge?
Yes.

(R. 347 at 122-123)
From this exchange, Counsel for the Defense revealed four (4) facts that
prejudiced the jury against the Defendant; 1) that the defendant has a criminal history
involving drugs; 2) that this history was severe enough to warrant a one year commitment
to the Salt Lake County Jail; 3) that the Defendant also has a criminal history of
shoplifting, and 4) that a warrant was issued against the Defendant said shoplifting. None
of this information was brought up by the State during the State's presentation of its case
in chief.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
By introducing Defendant's prior criminal history, to include his
incarceration for a year at the Salt Lake County Jail, counsel for the Defendant rendered
deficient performance which fell below an objective standard of professional judgment
and that the deficiency was ultimately prejudicial to the Defendant.
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ARGUMENT
INTRODUCING DEFENDANT'S PAST CRIMINAL HISTORY INTO
EVIDENCE AMOUNTED TO INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL.

An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the first time on appeal
presents a question of law. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 542 (Utah Ct.App.1998). To prove
ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must show: (1) that counsel's performance
was objectively deficient, and (2) a reasonable probability exists that but for the deficient
conduct defendant would have obtained a more favorable outcome at trial. State v.
Crosby, 927 P.2d 638, 644 (Utah 1996); see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) (requiring that defendant show counsel's
performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced the case).
1. Counsel's Introduction of Otherwise Inadmissible Evidence of Defendant's
Criminal History was Objectively Deficient.
To satisfy the first part of the test, defendant must overcome the "strong
presumption that [his] trial counsel rendered adequate assistance," Crosby, 927 P.2d at
644, by persuading the court that there was no "conceivable tactical basis for counsel's
actions," Bryant, 965 P.2d at 542 (emphasis added); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689,
104 S.Ct. 2052 (indicating that counsel should be given wide latitude in making tactical
decisions). The court "give[s] trial counsel wide latitude in making tactical decisions and
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will not question such decisions unless there is no reasonable basis supporting them."
Crosby, 927 P.2d at 644.
Furthermore, in reviewing an alleged deficiency in counsel's trial performance,
this court "must 'indulge in the strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the
wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome
the presumption that under the circumstances, the challenged action "might be considered
sound trial strategy." "' State v. Garrett, 849 P.2d 578, 579 (Utah Ct.App. 1993) (quoting
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065) (citation omitted).
Therefore, before this court would reverse a conviction based on ineffective
assistance of counsel, this court must be persuaded that there was a "iack of any
conceivable tactical basis for counsel's actions." Id. (quoting State v. Moritzsky, 111 P.2d
688, 692 (Utah Ct.App. 1989)); accord State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1225 (Utah 1993).
Put another way, "[i]f a rational basis for counsel's performance can be articulated, [the
court] will assume counsel acted competently." State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 468
(Utah Ct.App. 1993).
During the State's case in chief, no evidence was introduced regarding the
Defendant's criminal history. It wasn't until after the State had rested and the
Defendant's own Counsel was directly examining Defendant that Counsel brought out
the Defendant's history of past criminal convictions of shoplifting and possession of
controlled substance, Defendant's prior substantial jail sentence, and the fact that the
Defendant had previous warrants for his arrest. (R. 347 at 122-123) The introduction of
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the Defendant's criminal history by his own counsel prejudiced the jury and had no
possible reasonable basis for supporting a tactical trial strategy. There exists no
reasonable defense strategy that can be articulated that involves admitting into evidence
damaging information about the Defendant's criminal history, especially when our own
Utah Rules of Evidence provide the Defendant a certain protection by keeping out
evidence which is irrelevant, Utah R.Evid. 402, evidence of other crimes or wrongs, Utah
R.Evid. 404(b), or even relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury.... Utah R.Evid. 403. In this case, the State never even attempted introduce such
evidence, probably because they knew that upon the objection, the evidence would not be
allowed in. The lack of any conceivable tactical basis for counsel's actions in this case
overcome the strong presumption outlined in Garrett "that counsel's conduct falls within
the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." 849 P.2d at 579 (quoting
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065) (citation omitted). It is clear that
Counsel's performance in this case was deficient, satisfying the requirements for the first
prong of the ineffectiveness argument.
2. A Reasonable Probability Exists that but for the Deficient Conduct
Defendant Would have Obtained a More Favorable Outcome at Trial.
But for the Defense Counsel's introduction of the Defendant's criminal history,
the jury would have not been presented prejudicial evidence against the Defendant and
the jury would have returned a more favorable outcome.
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CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
For the foregoing reasons, Venord asks this Court to reverse and remand to the
Fourth District Court for a new trial.

lA.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this V±_ day of May, 2004

iM&AHv&s
t(

R. Paul Dusty" Kawai
Counsel for Appellant

M. Paig
Counsel for Appellant
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_,ection
S6 5 404 1
1

ft 5 406 3
ft 5 406 5

,/6 5 407
^6 5 408
46 5 409
46 5 410
76 5 411
76 5 412

76 5 413

(c) a n act, committed with unlawful force or violence,
that causes bodily injury to another or creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor
V3) Assault is a class A misaemeanor i5
(a) t h e person causes substantial bodily injury to another, or
(b) t h e victim is pregnant and the person has knowledge of the pregnancy
(4) It is not a defense against assault, that the accused
yused serious bodily injury to another
2003

Sexual abuse of a child — Aggravated sexual
abuse of a child

ft 5 406

76-5-102.8

Sexual offenses against t h e victim without
consent of victim — Circumstances
Applicability of sentencing provisions
Circumstances required for probation or suspension of sentence for certain sex offenses
against a child
Applicability of p a r t — "Penetration" or "touching" sufficient to constitute offense
Reserved
Corroboration of admission by child's statement
Child victim of sexual abuse as competent
witness
Admissibility of out-of-court statement of child
victim of sexual abuse
Custodial sexual relations — Custodial sexual
misconduct — Definitions — Penalties —
Defenses
Custodial sexual relations or misconduct with
youth receiving state services — Definitions
— Penalties — Defenses [Effective until July
1, 2004]
Custodial sexual relations or misconduct with
youth receiving state services — Definitions
— Penalties — Defenses [Effective July 1,

-^-5-102.3. Assault against school employees.
(1) Any person who assaults an employee of a public or
/ivate school, with knowledge that the individual is a n
•P^iployee, and when the employee is acting within the scope of
, j£ authority as a n employee, is guilty of a class A misdeeanor
n>' (2) As used in this section, "employee" includes a volunteer
1992

_^-5-102.4. Assault against p e a c e officer — Penalty.
(1) Any person who assaults a peace officer, with knowledge
,-^at he is a peace officer, and when the peace officer is acting
.jthin the scope of his authority as a peace officer, is guilty of
£lass A misdemeanor
(2) A person who violates this section shall serve, in jail or
.other correctional facility, a minimum of
a^(
(a) 90 consecutive days for a second offense, and
(b) 180 consecutive days for each subsequent offense
(£\ The. CA\J3± m a ^ suspend, the. vm^c^\tvcK\. <«: ^&<33&U&L Q£

JMO. sentence required under Subsection (2) if the court finds
>Jiat the interests of justice would be best served and makes
.pecific findings concerning the disposition in writing or on the

Part 5

. e COrd

HIV Testing — Sexual Offenders a n d V i c t i m s
Definitions
Mandatory testing — Liability for costs
Voluntary testing — Victim to request — Costs
paid by Crime Victim Reparations
Victim notification and counseling
PARTI

1998

70-5-102.5. A s s a u l t b y prisoner.
Any prisoner who commits assault, intending to cause
v^dily injury, is guilty of a felony of the third degree
1974
7#-5-102.6. Assault o n a correctional officer.
Any prisoner who throws or otherwise propels fecal material
0f any other substance or object at a peace or correctional
$icer is guilty of a class A misdemeanor
1994

7^-5-102.7. A s s a u l t against h e a l t h care provider a n d
e m e r g e n c y medical service worker — P e n alty.
" P n s o n e r r defined [Effective until J u l y 1,
(1) A person who assaults a health care provider or emer2004]
gency medical service worker is guilty of a class A misderposes of this part "prisoner" means any person who
eanor if
^ody of a peace officer pursuant to a lawful arrest or
(a) t h e person knew that the victim was a health care
unfilled m a jail or other penal institution or a facility
provider or emergency medical service worker, and
confinement of delinquent juveniles operated by the
(b) t h e health care provider or emergency medical
M Youth Corrections regardless of whether t h e conservice worker was performing emergency or life saving
° ~~al
1994
duties withm t h e scope of his authority at the time of the
assault
PriS nerW
defined
2004]
°
[Effective J u l y 1,
C2) As used m this section
(a) "Emergency medical service worker" means a perP ^ ^ ^ ^ a ^ « ^ t t p T \ s o - i i e ^ m e a n s any person who
son certified under Section 26-8a-302
ned m P e a C 1 0 f E ° e r p u r s u a n t t o a l a w M arrest or
(b) "Health care provider" has the meaning as provided
. ^ a jail or other penal institution or a facility
in Section 78 14 3
1999
delln
4 ?
q u e n t juveniles operated by the
| l S ~ S t l C e S e r V 1 C e s r e ^ d l e s s of whether the
76-5-102.8. D i s a r m i n g a p e a c e officer.
*- ^
2003
A person is guilty of a first degree felony who intentionally
tult.
^ k e s or removes, or attempts to take or remove, a firearm
from the person or immediate presence of a person he knows
X5 a peace officer
1 f rCe r
W t0 d
(1) without t h e consent of the peace officer, and
(2) while t h e peace officer is acting within the scope of
a n i e d b y a S W of
^^bS?i
^ m e d i a t e force
his authority as a peace officer
1999
^
bodily mjury to another, or
ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES

^ l l ^ ^

°

° ™

'

°

LT-H RULES OF E^ .DENCE

Rule 401

ARTICLE IV. RELEVANCY
AND ITS LIMITS
T? ile 401- Definition G f "relevant evidence."
e

"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the
tence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
r e probable or less probable t h a n it would be without the evidence

Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is
f deral rule, verbatim, and is comparable m
hstance to Rule 1(2), Utah Rules of Evidence
nq71) but the former rule defined relevant
11Hence as that having a tendency to prove or

disprove the existence of any "material fact "
Avoiding the use of the term "material fact"
accords with the application given to former
Rule 1(2) by the U t a h Supreme Court State v
Peterson, 560 P 2 d 1387 (Utah 1977)

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Burden of proof
Discovery
Effect of remoteness
Relationship to crime charged
Victim's testimony on defense theory
fited
Burden of proof.
The defendant failed to meet his burden to
lay the necessary two-part foundation of relevance to admit evidence of the witness's health
history offered for the purpose of attacking the
witness's credibility, because he did not show
that the witness's mental health disorder impaired the witness's ability to accurately perceive, recall, and relate events, nor did defendant offer evidence t h a t the disability was
contemporaneous with the witness's observations or testimony State v Stewart, 925 P 2 d
598 (Utah Ct App 1996)
In a prosecution for rape, it was not error to
exclude testimony of defendant's expert on J a p anese cultural values since its only relevance
was to the credibility of the victim, not any
elements of the crime, and defendant did not
lay a proper foundation for its admission State
v Fmlayson, 956 P 2 d 283 (Utah Ct App 1998)
Discovery.
Defendant's stipulation that she would not
use a vehicle valuation comparison at trial
removed any need plaintiff might have had for
information useful to impeach t h a t document
The mformation sought was therefore irrelevant and undiscoverable Major v Hills, 1999
UT 44, 980 P 2d 683
Effect of r e m o t e n e s s .
Remoteness usually goes to the weight of t h e
evidence and not its admissibility Terry v
pons Coop Mercantile I n s t , 605 P 2 d 314
vUah 1979), overruled on other grounds,

McFarland v Skaggs Cos , Inc , 678 P 2 d 298
(Utah 1984)
R e l a t i o n s h i p to crime charged.
Evidence of nicknames, chants, and dances
by defendant and his friends, which was not
remote in. either time or place and provided
background for the rape charged, was admissible State v Boyd, 2001 UT 30, 25 P 3 d 985
Victim's t e s t i m o n y o n defense theory.
In a prosecution for attempted aggravated
murder arising from an incident m which the
defendant, while a passenger in an automobile,
t h r u s t a gun at a police officer after the vehicle
was stopped for a traffic violation, the court
properly excluded testimony as to whether the
officer had ever heard of people pulling guns on
police officers m an attempt to commit suicide,
as any such knowledge by the police officer was
not relevant to the defendant's state of mind at
the time of t h e incident and as the defendant
was allowed to present his theory of "officer
assisted suicide" by other means State v
Colwell, 2000 UT 8, 994 P 2 d 177
Cited in State v Gray, 717 P 2 d 1313 (Utah
1986), State v Nickles, 728 P 2 d 123 (Utah
1986), Meyers v Salt Lake City Corp , 747 P 2 d
1058 (Utah Ct App 1988), Fisher ex rel Fisher
v Trapp, 748 P 2 d 204 (Utah Ct App 1988),
Belden v Dalbo, Inc , 752 P 2 d 1317 (Utah Ct
App 1988), State v Worthen, 765 P 2 d 839
(Utah 1988), State v Maurer, 770 P 2 d 981
(Utah 1989), State, In re R D S , 777 P 2 d 532
(Utah Ct App 1989) Whitehead v American
Motors Sales Corp , 801 P 2 d 920 (Utah 1990),
State v Pascual, 804 P 2 d 553 (Utah Ct App
1991), State v Larsen, 828 P 2 d 487 (Utah Ct
App 1992), State v 633 E 640 N , 942 P 2 d 925
(Utah 1997), State v Nelson-Waggoner, 2000
U T 5 9 , 6 P 3d 1120

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Utah Rules of Evin c e 1983>a985 Utah L Rev 63, 78
united States v Downing Novel Scientific
evidence and the Rejection of Frye, 1986 U t a h
L
Rev 839
A L R . — Admissibility of evidence of ab

sence of other accidents or injuries at place
where injury or damage occurred, 10 A L R 5th
371
Admissibility of evidence in homicide case
t h a t victim was threatened by one other t h a n
defendant, 11 A L R 5th 831

Rule 402

UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE

648

Rule 402. Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrelevant evidence inadmissible.
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the
Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah,
statute, or by these rules, or by other rules applicable in courts of this state.
Evidence which is not relevant is not admissibleAdvisory Committee Note. — The text of
this rule is Rule 402, Uniform Rules of Evidence (1974) except that prior to the word
"statute" the words "Constitution of the United
States" have been added.

Compiler's N o t e s . — The Utah rule also
adds the words "or the Constitution of the state
of Utah" to Rule 402, Uniform Rules of Evidence (1974).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Discretion of court.
Effect of remoteness.
Harmless error.
Irrelevant evidence.
Other crimes.
Probability evidence.
Relevance,
Scientific evidence.
Standard of review.
Cited.
D i s c r e t i o n of court.
The trial court is given considerable discretion in deciding whether or not evidence submitted is relevant. Bambrough v. Bethers, 552
P.2d 1286 (Utah 1976).
While relevant evidence is generally admissible, a trial court has broad discretion to determine whether proffered evidence is relevant,
and the appellate court will find error in a
relevancy ruling only if the trial court h a s
abused its discretion. State v. Harrison, 805
R2d 769 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 817 P.2d
327 (Utah 1991).
In a personal injury action, the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence
of plaintiff's prior injuries because they were
relevant to t h e issues of causation and damages. Ortiz v. Geneva Rock Prods., Inc., 939
P.2d 1213 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).
Effect of r e m o t e n e s s .
Remoteness usually goes to the weight of the
evidence and not its admissibility. Terry v.
Zions Coop. Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d 314
(Utah 1979), overruled on other grounds,
McFarland v. Skaggs Cos., Inc., 678 P.2d 298
(Utah 1984).
H a r m l e s s error.
Even if the admission of testimony regarding
the ammunition and firing status of firearms
used in the commission of a crime was erroneous, t h a t error was harmless where the defendant objected only to the first attempt to admit
the evidence and failed to raise an objection to
the admission of the testimony from later witnesses, since the evidence would have been
before the jury and the reviewing court could
not say there was a reasonable likelihood of a
more favorable result. State v. Kohl, 2000 UT
35, 999 P.2d 7.
Irrelevant e v i d e n c e .
Testimony as to impulsiveness of another

participant in the crime had no bearing on
defendant's guilt or innocence and was properly
excluded as not relevant to defendant's participation in the crime. State v. Stephens, 667 P.2d
586 (Utah 1983).
O t h e r crimes.
In deciding whether evidence of other crimes
is admissible under Rule 404(b), the trial court
m u s t determine (1) whether such evidence is
being offered for a proper, noncharacter purpose under t h a t rule, (2) whether such evidence
meets the. requirements of Rule 402, and (3)
whether it meets the requirements of Rule 403.
State v. DeCorso, 1999 UT 57, 993 P.2d 837,
cert, denied, 528 U.S. 1164,120 S. Ct. 1181,145
L. Ed. 2d 1088 (2000).
Probability e v i d e n c e .
Courts have routinely excluded probability
evidence when the evidence invites the jury to
focus upon a seemingly scientific, numerical
conclusion r a t h e r t h a n to analyze the evidence
before it and decide where t r u t h lies. State v.
Rammel, 721 P.2d 498 (Utah 1986).
Relevance.
In an action arising from a motor vehicle
accident in which the sole issue was the extent
of damages, evidence t h a t the defendant was
not injured in the accident was relevant as an
indicator of the severity of the accident.
Robinson v. All-Star Delivery, Inc., 1999 UT
109, 992 R2d 969.
Defendant's statements to one individual
t h a t he would be better off killing his wife than
divorcing her, to his girlfriend that his wife was
going to have an "accident/' and to another
individual asking him to kill his wife were
relevant as they tended to demonstrate defendant had a plan, intent, and motive to kill his
wife. State v. Mead, 2001 UT 58, 27 P.3d 1115.
Scientific e v i d e n c e .
The Frye test (that scientific tests still in the
experimental stages should not be admitted in
evidence, b u t that scientific testimony deduced
from a well recognized scientific principle or
discovery is admissible if the scientific principle
is sufficiently established) is a valid test,
though not necessarily an exclusive test, for
determining when scientific evidence is sufficiently reliable to be admitted and is not incon-
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Note, Utah Rule of Evidence 403 and Gruesome Photographs Is a Picture Worth Anything
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A.L.R. — Admissibility of voice stress evaluation test results or of statements made during
test, 47 A L R 4th 1202
Admissibility and weight of evidence of prior
misidentification of accused m connection with
commission of crime similar to that presently
charged, 50 A L R 4th 1049
Products liability admissibility of evidence of
absence of other accidents, 51 A L R 4th 1186
Thermographic tests admissibility of test

results m personal injury suits, 56 A L R 4th
1105
Criminal law dog scent discrimination lineups, 63 A L R 4th 143
Products liability admissibility of experimental or test evidence to disprove defect in
motor vehicle, 64 A L R 4th 125
Admissibility, in criminal cases, of evidence
of electrophoresis
of dried
evidentiary
bloodstains, 66 A L R 4th 588
Admissibility, m prosecution for sex-related
offense, of results of tests on semen or seminal
fluids, 75 A L R 4th 897
Admissibility of hypnotically refreshed or enhanced testimony, 77 A L R 4th 927
Admissibility of DNA identification evidence,
84 A L R 4th 313
Admissibility m evidence of composite picture or sketch produced by police to identify
offender, 23 A L R 5th 672
Admissibility of results of presumptive tests
indicating presence of blood on object, 82
A L R 5th 67

Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of
prejudice, confusion, or w a s t e of time.
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is
the federal rule, verbatim, and is substantively
comparable to Rule 45, Utah Rules of Evidence
(1971) except that "surprise" is not included as
a basis for exclusion of relevant evidence The
change m language is not one of substance,
since "surpuse" would be within the concept of
"unfair prejudice" as contained in Rule 403 See
also Advisory Committee Note to Federal Rule
403 indicating that a continuance in most instances would be a more appropriate method of

dealing with "surprise" See also Smith v
Estelle, 445 F Supp 647 ( N D Tex 1977)
(surprise use of psychiatric testimony m capital
case ruled prejudicial and violation of due process) See the following Utah cases to the same
effect Terry v Zions Coop Mercantile I n s t , 605
P 2 d 314 (Utah 1979), State v Johns, 615 P 2 d
1260 (Utah 1980), Reiser v Lohner, 641 P 2 d 93
(Utah 1982)
Cross-References. — Admissibility of evidence, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 43(a)

NOTES TO DECISIONS
balancing test
Bias
Blood soaked clothing
^hildhood sexual experiences
^rcumstantial evidence
^onfusion of issues
Credibility of witness
J^mulative evidence
^termination of admissibility
disability benefits

Expert testimony
Extent of damages
Film of murder scene
Guilty plea
Harmful error
Harmless error
Impeachment of witness
Inflammatory evidence
Offensive remarks
Other offenses
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Rule 404. C h a r a c t e r evidence not admissible to prove
conduct; exceptions; other crimes.
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trait
of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity
therewith on a particular occasion, except:
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered by
a n accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or if evidence of a trait of
character of the alleged victim of the crime is offered by the accused and
admitted under Rule 404(a)(2), evidence of the same trait of character of the
accused offered by the prosecution;
(2) Character of alleged victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of
the alleged victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to
rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the alleged
victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence t h a t the
alleged victim was the first aggressor;
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided
in Rules 607, 608, and 609.
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is
not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such,
as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,
or absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the accused,
the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance
of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown,
of the nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992; February 11, 1998; November 1, 2001.)
Advisory C o m m i t t e e Note. — Provisions
of this rule apply to character evidence to prove
conduct, as distinguished from proof of character where character is an essential element of a
charge, claim or defense. As to the latter, see
Rule 405(b). See also Advisory Committee Note
to Rule 404, Federal Rules of Evidence. Rule
47, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) was comparable See also State v. Day, 572 P 2 d 703 (Utah
1977) (character evidence as to the character of
the victim of a homicide was admissible to
rebut the defendant's contention t h a t the deceased was the aggressor). One significant difference between this rule and Rule 47, Utah
Rules of Evidence (1971) is that there is no
provision for the use of character evidence in
civil cases, except where character is the ultimate issue in question, whereas Rule 47 authorized the use of character evidence m civil cases
not only on the ultimate issue but where otherwise substantively relevant. See Boyce, Character Evidence: The Substantive Use, 4 Utah
Bar J. 13,18-19 (1976). However, Rule 48, U t a h
Rules of Evidence (1971) expressly excluded
character evidence with respect to a trait as to
care or skill. The Advisory Committee to the
Federal Rules of Evidence concluded that the
remaining justification for the admission of
character evidence was so insignificant t h a t
character evidence in civil cases should not be
admitted unless it was in issue.
Subdivision (b) is comparable to Rule 55,
Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). State v.
Forsyth, 641 P.2d 1172 (Utah 1982). See Boyce,
Evidence of Other Crimes or Wrongdoing, 5
ut
a h Bar J. 31 (1977).

The 1998 amendment abandons the additional requirements for admitting evidence under Rule 404(b) imposed by State v. Doporto,
935 R2d 484 (Utah 1997). It clarifies t h a t
evidence of other crimes^ wrongs, or acts, offered under 404(b), is admissible if it is relevant
for a non-character purpose and meets the
requirement of Rules 402 and 403.
Utah's existing Rule 404 is otherwise identical to Federal Rule of Evidence Rule 404 and
the equivalent rule in most other states. This
amendment to the rule is not intended to depart from the meaning and interpretation given
to the equivalent rule in other jurisdictions, but
to return to the traditional application of Rule
404 prior to Doporto.
Rule 404 is now Federal Rule of Evidence 404
verbatim. The 2001 amendments add the notice
provisions already in the federal rule, add t h e
amendments made to the federal rule effective
December 1, 2000, and deleted language added
to the Utah Rule 404(b) m 1998. However, the
deletion of t h a t language is not intended to
reinstate the holding of State v. Doporto, 935
R2d 484 (Utah 1997). Evidence sought to be
admitted under Rule 404(b) must also conform
with Rules 402 and 403 to be admissible.
A m e n d m e n t Notes. — The Supreme Court
of Utah, by emergency rule, effective February
11, 1998, amended this rule by adding the last
sentence to Subdivision (b). See t h e Advisory
Committe Note above explaining the amendment.
The 2001 amendment added the language
beginning "or if evidence" in Subdivision (a)(1);
inserted "alleged" before "victim" four times in

